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Urheberrechtshinweis / Copyright notice
Bitte beziehen Sie sich beim Zitieren dieses Dokumentes immer auf folgende URN: urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-13747 URL: http://opus.kobv.de/ubp/volltexte/2007/1374/ Sanner, Helge
Bargaining structure and regional unemployment insurance
Kurzfassung auf DeutschThis study examines how the size of trade unions relative to the la-bor force impacts on the desirability of different organizational forms of self-financing unemployment insurance (UI) for workers, firms, and with reference to an efficiency criterion. For this purpose, we respectively nu- merically compare the outcome of a model with a uniform payroll tax to a model where workers pay taxes according to their systematic risk of unemployment. Our results highlight the importance of the bargaining structure for the assessment of a particular UI scheme. Most importantly, it depends on the size of the unions whether efficiency favors a uniform or a differentiated UI scheme.
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