Imperfect goods and labor markets, and the union wage gap

  • Existing theoretical literature fails to explain satisfactorily the differences between the pay of workers that are covered by collective agreements and others who are not. This study aims at providing a model framework which is amenable for an analysis of this issue. Our general-equilibrium approach integrates a dual labor market and a two-sector product market. The results suggest that the so-called 'union wage gap' is largely determined by the degree of centralization of the bargains, and, to a somewhat lesser extent, by the expenditure share of the unionized sector's goods.

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Metadaten
Author details:Helge SannerGND
URN:urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-6511
Publication type:Postprint
Language:English
Publication year:2005
Publishing institution:Universität Potsdam
Release date:2006/02/16
Tag:comparative analysis; dual labor market; monopolistic competition; union wage premium; wage differentials
GND Keyword:Verhandlungstheorie; Monopolistische Konkurrenz; Gewerkschaften
Source:Journal of Population Economics. - ISSN 1432-1475. - Online First (2006), S. 1 - 18
RVK - Regensburg classification:QC 220, QC 340
Organizational units:Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät / Wirtschaftswissenschaften
DDC classification:3 Sozialwissenschaften / 33 Wirtschaft / 330 Wirtschaft
External remark:The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com
DOI: 10.1007/s00148-005-0010-6
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